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ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 17,2000, the Appellant was convicted of the felony charge of Lewd 
Conduct with a Minor under Sixteen, Idaho Code Section 18-1508, in Jerome County 
Case No. CR-2000-16. The Judgment of Conviction was entered on July 17,2000. (R. 
pp. 20-28.) At the time of sentence the Appellant was notified of his duty to register as a 
sex offender. After completing the Rider Program, the Appellant on January 22,2001, 
was placed on probation for a period of ten (10) years. The Appellant was discharged 
from probation on July 7,2011. 
At the time of entry of the Judgment of Conviction, Idaho Code Section 18-8303 
did not contain a definition nor did it refer to the term of "Aggravated Offense". The 
term and definition for Aggravated Offense was not added until July 1,2001, and this 
tenn was later further amended effective July 1,2009. 
On February 8,2013, the Appellant filed a Petition to be Released from 
Registration Requirements pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-8310. (R. pp. 4-5.) The 
Petition was supported by an Affidavit of the Appellant. (R. pp. 6-10.) 
On February 12,2013, the District Court entered an Order Denying Hearing and 
to Show Cause Re: Dismissal of Petition to be Released from Registration Requirements. 
(R. pp. 11-28.) The Order to Show Cause was issued because on the fact of the Judgment 
uf Conviction, the offense of which the Appellant was convicted as an Aggravated 
Offense based on the definition effective July 1,2009 and as such the Appellant did not 
qualify for the relief sought. On February 26,2013, the Appellant filed his Response and 
an Amended Petition and Affidavit to be Released from Registration Requirements. (R. 
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pp. 29-40.) The Appellant in his response sought to challenge the constitutionality of the 
amendment of Idaho Code Section l8-8303( 1). 
On February 28,2013, the District Comi entered its order setting a hearing to 
detem1ine the constitutionality of the subject amendment of Idaho Code Section 18-
8303(1) as concems the Appellant's Petition to be released from the sex offender 
registration requirements. (R. pp. 41-43.) 
Appellant filed a Legislative History of Idaho Code Section 18-8303 on or about 
May 6,2013 (R. pp. 53-60) and a Memorandum in Support of Release from Registration 
on or about May 24, 2013. (R. pp. 63-78) The State filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
on or about May 29,2013. (R. pp. 79-91) with the Appellant filing a Reply 
Memorandum on or about June 7, 2013. (R. pp. 92-99.) 
On June 12,2013, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision Re: 
Constitutionality of2009 Amendment to Idaho Code Section 18-8303(1) and Judgment 
of Dismissal with Prejudice. (R. pp. 100-118.) Appellant timely filed a Notice of 
Appeal. (R. pp. 119-121.) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Memorandum Decision Re: Constitutionality of 2009 
Amendment to Idaho Code Section 18-8303(1) and Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice 
entered by the Honorable John K. Butler on or about June 12,2013, finding that the 2009 
amendment to SORA was constitutional and otherwise enforceable as to the Appellant 
because the Appellant \vas convicted of an "aggravated offense", and further finding that 
the Appellant was not entitled (had no standing) to petition for release from the sex 
offender registration requirements. 
2 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
(1) Whether the Court erred in summarily dismissing the Appellant's 
Petition on the basis that a retroactive app lication of SORA amendments 
did not violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions; 
(2) Whether the Court erred in failing to grant the Appellant an evidentiary 
hearing thereby violating Appellant's right to due process to be given an 
opportunity to be heard relative to the punitive nature of the SORA 
amendments; 
ARGUMENT 
Gi ven that the majority of this Brief focuses on Idaho Code Sections 18-8310 and 
18-8303, it is important for the Court to understand the legislative history of those two 
Code Sections. Therefore, the Appellant respectfully submits the following legislative 
history in that regard. In addition, the Appellant asks that this Court take judicial notice, 
in particular, of the case of State v. Doe A, 297 P.3d 885 (Alaska 2013) (wherein the 
Supreme Court of Alaska found that AS ORA was punitive, and that its retroactive 
application therefore violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Alaska Constitution.) as 
strongly suggestive of the Appellant's stance in this case. 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Effective July 1, 1998, ID LEGIS 411 (1998), more commonly known as the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act, went into effect. At that time Idaho Code 
Section 18-8310 read as follows: 
18-8310. RELEASE FROM REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS 
-EXPUNGEMENT. 
(1) Any person, other than one designated as a violent sexual predator, 
may, after a period often (10) years from the date the person was released 
from incarceration or placed on parole, supervised release or probation, 
whichever is greater, petition the district court for a show cause hearing to 
detem1ine whether the person shall be exempted from the duty to register 
as a sexual offender. In the petition the petitioner shall: 
(a) Provide clear and convincing evidence that the 
petitioner is not a risk to commit a new violation for any 
violent crime or crime identified in section 18-8304, Idaho 
Code; 
(b) Provide an affidavit indicating that the petitioner does 
not have a criminal charge pending nor is the petitioner 
knowingly under criminal investigation for any violent 
crime or crime identified in section 18-8304, Idaho Code; 
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(c) Provide proof of service of such petition upon the 
county prosecuting attorney for the county in which the 
application is made; and 
(d) Provide a certified copy of the judgment of conviction 
which caused the petitioner to report as a sexual offender. 
The district court may grant a hearing if it finds that the petition is 
sufficient. The court shall provide at least sixty (60) days prior notice of 
the hearing to the petitioner and the county prosecuting attorney. 
The court may exempt the petitioner from the reporting requirement only 
after a hearing on the petition in open court and only upon proofby clear 
and convincing evidence that the petitioner is not a risk to commit a new 
violation for any violent crime or crime identified in section 18-8304, 
Idaho Code. 
(2) Concurrent with the entry of any order exempting the petitioner from 
the reporting requirement, the court may further order that any information 
regarding the petitioner be expunged from the central registry. 
The Legislature amended Idaho Code Section 18-8310 in 2000 which had the 
effect of excluding a recidivist from release from registration requirements. As of 
the time of this amendment, Appellant's right to be free from registration had not 
been substantially interfered with. Idaho Code Section 18-8310 was amended in 
2000 to read as follows (amended section only, effective July 1,2000): 
18-8310. RELEASE FROM REGISTRATION 
REQUIREMENTS-EXPUNGEMENT. 
(I) Any person, other than «-one-» «+a recidivist or an offender+» 
designated as a violent sexual predator, may, after a period of ten (10) 
years from the date the person was released from incarceration or placed 
on parole, supervised release or probation, whichever is greater, petition 
the district court for a show cause hearing to determine whether the person 
shall be exempted from the duty to register as a sexual offender. In the 
petition the petitioner shall: 
The Legislature amended Idaho Code Section 18-8310 again in 2001 which 
had the effect of excluding an offender who has been convicted of an aggravated 
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offellse. This Amendment created a new classification of sex offenders. At the time 
of this Amendment, the Appellant's right to be free of registration had not been 
substantially affected because the victim of his crime was twelve (12) years of age at 
the time of the commission of the offense. Idaho Code Section 18-8310 was amended 
in 2001 to read as follows (amended section only, effective July 1,2001): 
\8-8310. RELEASE FROM REGISTRA nON 
REQUIREMENTS-EXPUNGEMENT. 
(1) Any person, other than a recidivist«+, an offender who has been 
convicted of an aggravated offense,+» or an offender designated as a 
violent sexual predator, may, after a period of ten (10) years from the date 
the person was released from incarceration or placed on parole, supervised 
release or probation, whichever is greater, petition the district court for a 
show cause hearing to determine whether the person shall be exempted 
from the duty to register as a sexual offender. 
The Statement of Purpose for the 2001 amendment states as follows: 
This legislation, in effect, creates a new category of sex offender, that of 
the aggravated offender. The legislation accomplishes this by defining the 
tem1 "aggravated offense" in Idaho Code Section 18-8303. Aggravated 
offenses are those sex crimes which are of a very serious nature. 
The legislation also amends Idaho Code Section 18-8310, which provides 
for the release of sex offenders from registration requirements. The 
legislation provides that an individual who is convicted of an aggravated 
offense may not petition a court to be released from the requirement to 
register as a sex offender. 
In addition to the aggravated offense provisions, the legislation also makes 
a technical correction to Idaho Code Section 18-8304, by deleting 
language which is confusing, and which does not describe a chargeable 
offense. 
The Legislature's amendment ofldaho Code Sections 18-8310 and 18-8303 
now precludes any offender who was convicted of the charge of lewd and lascivious 
conduct, when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age. Idaho Code Section 
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18-8303 was amended to include the definition of an "aggravated offense" as: 
"Aggravated offense" means any of the following crimes as set forth in 
section 18-8304, Idaho Code: 18-1508 (lewd conduct, when the victim is 
less than twelve (12) years of age); 18-4003(d) (murder committed in the 
perpetration of rape); 18-6101 (rape, but excluding section 18-6101 (1 ) 
where the victim is at least twelve (12) years of age or the defendant is 
eighteen (18) years of age or younger); 18-6108 (male rape); and 18-6608 
(forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object). 
Idaho Code Section 18-8310 was amended again in 2009 to read as follows 
(effective July 1,2009): 
18-8310. Release from registration requirements-Expungement 
(1) Any person, other than a recidivist, an offender who has been 
convicted of an aggravated offense, or an offender designated as a violent 
sexual predator, may, after a period of ten (10) years from the date the 
person was released from incarceration or placed on parole, supervised 
release or probation, whichever is greater, petition the district court for a 
show cause hearing to determine whether the person shall be exempted 
from the duty to register as a sexual offender. In the petition the petitioner 
shall: 
(a) Provide clear and convincing evidence that the 
petitioner is not a risk to commit a new violation for any 
violent crime or crime identified in section 18-8304, Idaho 
Code; 
(b) Provide an affidavit indicating that the petitioner does 
not have a criminal charge pending nor is the petitioner 
knowingly under criminal investigation for any violent 
crime or crime identified in section 18-8304, Idaho Code; 
(c) Provide proofofservice of such petition upon the 
county prosecuting attorney for the county in \vhich the 
application is made and upon the central registry; and 
(d) Provide a certi fied copy of the judgment of conviction 
which caused the petitioner to report as a sexual offender. 
(2) The district court may grant a hearing if it finds that the petition is 
sufficient. The court shall provide at least sixty (60) days' prior notice of 
the hearing to the petitioner, and the county prosecuting attorney and the 
central registry. The central registry may appear or participate as a party. 
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(3) The court may exempt the petitioner from the reporting requirement 
only after a hearing on the petition in open court and only upon proofby 
clear and convincing evidence and upon written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law by the court that: 
(a) The court has reviewed the petitioner's criminal history 
and has determined that petitioner is not a recidivist, has 
not been convicted of an aggravated offense or has not been 
designated as a violent sexual predator; and 
(b) The petitioner is not a risk to commit a new violation 
for any violent crime or crime identified in section 
18-8304, Idaho Code. 
(4) Concurrent with the entry of any order exempting the petitioner from 
the reporting requirement, the court may further order that any information 
regarding the petitioner be expunged from the central registry. 
Idaho Code Section 18-8303 was also amended to read as follows: 
"Aggravated offense" means any of the following crimes as set forth in 
section 18-8304, Idaho Code: 18-1506A (ritualized abuse of a child); 
18-1508 (lewd conduct, when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of 
age); 18-4003( d) (murder committed in the perpetration of rape); 18-4502 
(first-degree kidnapping committed for the purpose ofrape, committing an 
infamous crime against nature, committing any lewd and lascivious act 
upon any child under the age of sixteen years or for purposes of sexual 
gratification or arousal); 18--4503 (second degree kidnapping where the 
victim is an unrelated minor child and the kidnapping is committed for the 
purpose of rape, committing an infamous crime against nature, committing 
any lewd and lascivious act upon any child under the age of sixteen years 
or for purposes of sexual gratification or arousal); 18-6101 (rape, but 
excluding section 18-6101(1) where the victim is at least twelve (12) years 
of age or the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or younger); 18-6108 
( male rape); and 18-6608 (forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign 
object); 18-8602( 1) (sex trafficking); and any other offense set forth in 
section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the 
offense the victim was below the age of thirteen years. 
Finally. in 2011. Idaho Code Section 18-8310 was amended to read as 
follows: 
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§ 18-8310. Release from registration requirements-- Expungement 
(I) Any person Registration under this act is for Ii fe; however, any 
offender, other than a recidivist, an offender who has been convicted of an 
aggravated offense, or an offender designated as a violent sexual predator, 
may, after a period often (10) years from the date the person offender was 
released from incarceration or placed on parole, supervised release or 
probation, whichever is greater, petition the district court for a show cause 
hearing to determine whether the person offender shall be exempted from 
the duty to register as a sexual offender. If the offender was convicted in 
Idaho, the offender shall file his or her petition in the county in which he 
or she was convicted. If the offender was convicted in a jurisdiction other 
than Idaho, then the offender shall file his or her petition in the county in 
which he or she resides. In the petition the petitioner shall: 
(a) Provide clear and convincing evidence that the 
petitioner is not a risk to commit a new violation for any 
violent crime or crime identified in section 18-8304, Idaho 
Code has completed any periods of supervised release, 
probation or parole without revocation; 
(b) Provide an affidavit indicating that the petitioner does 
not have a criminal charge pending nor is the petitioner 
knowingly under criminal investigation for any violent 
crime or crime identified in section 18-8304, Idaho Code; 
(c) Provide proof of service of such petition and supporting 
documents upon the county prosecuting attorney for the 
county in which the application is made and upon the 
central registry; and 
(d) Provide a certified copy of the judgment of conviction 
which caused the petitioner to report as a sexual offender; 
(e) Provide clear and convincing evidence that the 
petitioner has successfully completed a sexual offender 
treatment program; 
(f) Provide an affidavit demonstrating that the petitioner 
has no felony convictions during the period for which the 
petitioner has been registered; and 
(g) Provide an affidavit demonstrating that the petitioner 
has committed no sex offenses during the period for which 
the petitioner has been registered. 
(2) The county prosecuting attorney and the central registry may submit 
- 9 -
evidence, including by affidavit, rebutting the assertions contained within 
the offender's petition, affidavits or other documents filed in suppOli of the 
petition. 
(3) The district court may grant a hearing ifit finds that the petition is 
sufficient. The court shall provide at least sixty (60) days' prior notice of 
the hearing to the petitioner, the county prosecuting attorney and the 
central registry. The central registry may appear or participate as a party. 
(4) The court may exempt the petitioner from the reporting registration 
requirement only after a hearing on the petition in open court and only 
lIpon proofby clear and convincing evidence and upon written findings of 
fact and conclusions of law by the court that: 
(a) The petitioner has complied with the requirements set 
forth in subsection (1) of this section; 
(b) The court has reviewed the petitioner's criminal history 
and has determined that the petitioner is not a recidivist, has 
not been convicted of an aggravated offense or has not been 
designated as a violent sexual predator; and 
(c) The It is highly probable or reasonably certain the 
petitioner is not a risk to commit a new violation for any 
violent crime or crime identified in section 18-8304, Idaho 
Code. 
(5) Concurrent with the entry of any order exempting the petitioner from 
the reporting registration requirement, the court may further order that any 
infonnation regarding the petitioner be expunged from the central registry. 
The Legislature's final amendment to Idaho Code Section 18-8303 had the 
affect of excluding all of those persons who were convicted of lewd and lascivious 
conduct without reference to the previous exception which would apply should the 
victim be less than twelve (12) years of age. It is at this time in SORA's history that 
the Appellant's right to be free from registration was taken from him. The 
Legislature's final amendment to Idaho Code Section 18-8303 took place in the year 
2011, with the Code Section now reading as follows: 
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18-8303. DEFINITIONS. As used in this chapter: 
(I) "Aggravated offense" means any of the following crimes: 18-1506A 
(ritualized abuse of a child); 18-1508 (lewd conduct); 18-4003(d) (murder 
committed in the perpetration ofrape); 18-4502 (first-degree kidnapping 
committed for the purpose of rape, committing an infamous crime against 
nature, committing any lewd and lascivious act upon any child under the 
age of sixteen years or for purposes of sexual gratification or arousal); 
18-4503 (second degree kidnapping where the victim is an unrelated minor 
child and the kidnapping is committed for the purpose of rape, committing 
an infamous crime against nature, committing any lewd and lascivious act 
upon any child under the age of sixteen years or for purposes of sexual 
gratification or arousal); 18-6101 (rape, but excluding section 18-6101(1) 
where the victim is at least twelve years of age or the defendant is eighteen 
years of age); 18-6108 (male rape, but excluding section 18-6108(1) where 
the victim is at least twelve years of age or the defendant is eighteen years 
of age); 18-6608 (forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object); 
18-8602( 1) (sex trafficking); and any other offense set forth in section 
18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the 
victim was below the age of thirteen years or an offense that is 
substantially similar to any of the foregoing offenses under the laws of 
another jurisdiction or military court or the court of another country. 
APPLICATION OF SORA 
An ex post facto law is a law "passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission 
of an act which retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or 
deed." III Re Estate of Blodgett, 147 P.3d 702, 711 (Alaska 2006) quoting BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 520 (5 th ed. 1979). It is the Appellant's contention that the 
legislative amendments set forth above sllhstantially change the legal consequences of his 
conviction in violation of his constitutional rights. 
As the United States Supreme COUli set forth in Collins v. YOllllghlooc/, 497 U.S. 
37,41 (1990) "the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal 
statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them." If the legislature dubbed the 
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statute civil but enacted it with the intent to punish, and it would punish with retroactive 
effect, the law offends the Ex Post Facto Clause. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003). 
Whether a law is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory construction. Id. In the 
case of Doe, the Court found that Alaska's version of SORA, on its face, created a 
regulatory mechanism for sexual offender regulation for the legitimate purpose of 
protecting Alaska's citizens. Id. at 93. 
In Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S.S4 (2003) the U.S. Supreme Court applied the 
multi factor "intent-effects" test in their ex-post facto examination. ld. at 92. In assessing 
a statute's effects the U.S. Supreme Court has provided seven (7) factors that "may 
provide some guidance." Us. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980). 
Based upon Idaho case law, the Appellant acknowledges that the Legislature has 
attempted to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and non-punitive. Therefore, 
Appellant will focus upon the statutes' effects to determine whether they are punitive 
even though Appellant asserts SORA is unconstitutional both on its face, and in its 
application. 
1. Affirmative disability or restraint 
The first factor addressed concerns whether the sanction involves an affirmative 
disability or restraint. Appellant would assert that the amendments to SORA restrained 
him from changing residences or employment. As set forth in State 1'. Doe, 1S9 P.3d 999 
(200S) "the argument that registered sex offenders are free to change jobs and residences 
calls to mind Anatole France's view of the majestic quality of the laws, which forbid rich 
and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread." 
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Doe, at footnote 68. 
Appellant asserts that SORA imposes significant affinnative obligations and a 
severe stigma on every person to whom it applies. First, SORA compels affim1ative post 
discharge conduct (mandating registration, re-registration, disclosure of public and 
private inforn1ation, and updating of that infonnation) under threat of prosecution. Idaho 
Code Section 18-8301 et. Seq. The duties are significant and intrusive, because they 
compel offenders to contact law enforcement agencies and disclose infonnation, some of 
which is otherwise private, most of it for public dissemination. Furthennore, the time 
periods associated with SORA are intrusive. 
Appellant alleges that SORA exposes registrants, through aggressive public 
notification of their crimes, to profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism. In 
the decision reversed in Smith, the Ninth Circuit observed that "[b]y posting [registrants'] 
names, addresses, and employer addresses on the internet, the Act subjects [registrants] to 
community obloquy and scorn that damage them personally and professionally."Doe 1 v. 
Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit observed that the practical 
effect of this dissemination is that it leaves open the possibility that the registrant will be 
denied employment and housing opportunities as a result of community hostility. Id at 
988. As Justice Souter noted in concurring in Smith, "there is significant evidence of 
onerous practical effects of being listed 011 a sex offender registry." Smith at 109. There 
have been reports of incidents of suicide by and vigilantism against offenders on state 
registries. Doe at footnote 81. 
2. Sanctions that have historically been considered punishment 
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This Court should next examine "whether [the statute's effects have] historically 
been regarded as a punishment." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 
(1963). SORA does not expressly impose sanctions that have been historically 
considered punishment because registration acts such as SORA are of fairly recent origin, 
cOlllis addressing this issue have determined that there is no historical equivalent to these 
registration acts. Smith at 97. Some courts have instead considered whether the acts are 
analogous to the historical punishment of shaming; these courts have concluded that they 
are not. Dtte at 989. But the dissemination provision at least resembles the punishment of 
shaming (E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1115-19 (3 rd Cir. 1997) and the registration 
and disclosure provisions "are comparable to conditions of supervised release or parole." 
Smith at 115. And these provisions have effects like those resulting from punishment. 
The fact that SORA's registration reporting provisions are comparable to supervised 
release or parole supports a conclusion that ASORA is punitive. 
3. Finding of scienter 
Third, this Court should consider "whether [the statute] comes into play only on a 
finding of scienter. If Mendoza-Martinez at 168. The obligations of SORA are not 
imposed solely upon the finding of scienter. SORA also applies to strict liability offenses, 
such as statutory rape, that the law deems sufficiently hannful to effectively assume 
scienter. Idaho Code Section 18-8301 et. Seq. But even though SORA applies to a few 
strict liability offenses, it overwhelmingly applies to offenses that require a finding of 
scienter for conviction. Ie!. The few exceptions do not imply a non-punitive effect, given 
the assumption of scienter for those exceptions and the fact that a 
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reasonable-mistake-of-age defense is allowed in a charge of statutory rape. 
4. The traditional aims of punishment 
This Court should next examine "whether [the statute's] operation will promote 
the traditional aims of punishment retribution and deterrence. "lvfendoza-Martinez at 
168. But SORA's application to a broad spectrum of crimes regardless of their inherent or 
comparative seriousness suggests that such retributive and deterrent effects are not merely 
incidental to the statute's regulatory purpose. Every person convicted of a sex offense 
must provide the same information, and the state publishes that information in the same 
manner, whether the person was convicted of a misdemeanor or an unclassified felony. 
SORA's only differentiation is in the frequency and duration of a person's duty to register 
and disclose. Mendoza-Martinez at 168. But at any given moment the registration list 
does not distinguish those individuals the state considers to pose a high risk to society 
from those it views as posing a low risk. SORA determines who must register based not 
on a particul arized determination of the risk the person poses to society but rather on the 
criminal statute the person was convicted of violating. SORA's registration and unlimited 
public dissemination requirements provide a deterrent and retributive effect that goes 
beyond any non-punitive purpose and that essentially serves the traditional goals of 
punishment 
SORA applies only to those "convicted" of specified offenses. Idaho Code 18-
8310. Defendants charged vvith sex offenses but who plead out to non-sex offenses such 
as coercion or simple assault do not have to register even though they may have engaged 
in the same conduct as individuals who do have to register. lei. Likewise, even convicted 
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defendants \vhose convictions are overtumed for reasons other than insufficiency of 
evidence of guilt do not have to register despite having engaged in the same conduct. /d. 
An adult \vho commits a crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, but whose conviction is 
overtumed due to an illegal search, does not have to register. Id. Finally, SORA does not 
require registration for those charged with sex offenses but acquitted, even though they 
may have engaged in the same conduct as convicted sex offenders and might even be 
found civilly liable under a lesser standard ofproof./d. 
In other words, SORA fundamentally and invariably requires a judgment of guilt 
based on either a plea or proof under the criminal standard. It is therefore the 
determination of guilt of a sex offense beyond a reasonable doubt (or per a knowing plea), 
not merely the fact of the conduct and potential for recidivism, that triggers the 
registration requirement. Because it is the criminal conviction, and only the criminal 
conviction, that triggers obligations under SORA, this Court should conclude that SORA 
is punitive in effect. Smith at 115. 
It is significant that SORA's scope is broad; it encompasses a wide array of crimes 
that vary greatly in severity. Moreover, SORA provides no mechanism by which an 
"aggravated" offender can petition the state or a co1l11 for relief from the obligations of 
continued registration and disclosure. "Offenders cannot shorten their registration or 
noti fication period. even on the clearest determination of rehabilitation or conc lusive 
proof of physical incapacitation." Smith at 117. Hypothetically, John Doe successfully 
completed a treatment program and was granted early release fr0111 mandatory parole. A 
court granted him legal custody of his minor daughter based on its detemlination that he 
was successfully rehabilitated and posed a very low risk ofre-offending. Despite this 
evidence of rehabilitation, SORA requires Doe to register and requires the state to 
publicly disseminate his personal infOlmation for the rest of his life. See SORA generally. 
Under ex post facto analysis this Court should conclude that the statute's chosen means 
are excessive in relation to the statute's purpose because the statute is also underinclusive. 
SORA only applies to those convicted of specified offenses. Jd. It therefore excludes 
from its requirements individuals who may have committed the same acts and may pose 
threats to the public but who avoided conviction by pleading to a lesser charge or whose 
convictions were overturned. This fact should clearly illustrate that SORA has a punitive 
effect. SORA also imposes obligations that, for ex post facto purposes, are excessive in 
relation to the state's legitimate public safety interest. It is significant that the registration 
and re-registration requirements are demanding and intrusive and are of long duration. 
See Idaho Code Section 18-8301 et. Seq. Finally, the provisions authorizing or requiring 
the state to disseminate the information are sweeping. 
As stated in Doe: 
Summing up the effects under the seven factors, we conclude that 
AS ORA's effects are punitive, and convincingly outweigh the statute's 
non-punitive purposes and effects. We recognize that several of the factors 
seem closely related, and that discussion of one may overlap discussion of 
another. Nonetheless, it is not the mere number of factors that leads us to 
our conclusion, but our assessment of those factors and their relative 
weight. Six of those factors lead us to disagree, respectfully but fill11ly, 
with the Supreme Court's analysis and its ultimate conclusion that ASORA 
is not penal. Our decision is consistent \vith what we consider to be the 
compelling comments of dissenting justices in Smith and with the majority 
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel that, before reversal, discerned 
an ex post facto violation under federal law. 
Doc at 1018. 
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The Appellant acknowledges that the Idaho Courts have previously held that 
SORA "provides an essential regulatory purpose that assists law enforcement and parents 
in protecting children and communities." Ra:v v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 101 (1999). It is 
important to note that the case of Ray was decided before any of the legislative 
amendments to SORA. 
The Idaho Courts have considered ex post facto challenges to SORA in more 
recent cases. See State v. Gragg, 143 Idaho 74 (2005), State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41 
(2011). In the case of State v. Johnson, the Court discussed ex post facto challenges to 
SORA, however, ultimately vacated the case for lack of jurisdiction. As such, the issue 
presented to this Court by Appellant has not been decided in the State ofIdaho. 
The Appellant in this matter was sentenced for the felony offense of Lewd 
Conduct with a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen, on January 22, 2001. The 
sentence was five to ten years and the Appellant was placed on probation for a period of 
ten (10) years. He was thereafter discharged from probation on July 7, 2011. At the time 
of sentencing, the Appellant was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Idaho 
Code Section 18-8310, and continues to register as a sex offender. 
On February 8,2013, Appellant filed a petition with the District Court to be 
exempted from the duty to register. The District Court denied a hearing on February 12, 
2013, but allowed Appellant fifteen (15) days in which to show cause why the Petition 
should not be dismissed. The reasons for the initial denial of Appellant's Petition 
according to the District Court was that the offense that fonns the basis of Appellant's 
conviction (Lewd Conduct, Idaho Code Section 18-1508) as a matter of law is an 
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Aggravated Offense. Idaho Code Section IS-8303(1). And, of course, pursuant to Idaho 
Code Section IS-S303( 1) does provide, in relevant part, that: 
Registration under this act is for life; however, any offender, other than a 
recidivist, an offender who has been convicted of an aggravated offense, or 
an offender designated as violent sexual predator, may, after a period of 
ten (10) years from the date the offender was released from ... supervised 
release or probation, ... petition the district court for a show cause hearing 
to detennine whether the offender shall be exempted from the duty to 
register as a sexual offender...". 
However, as indicated in the brief history oflaw set out above, at the time the 
Appellant pled guilty in this matter, i.e., May 22, 2000, as well as at the time he was 
sentenced, i.e., July 17,2000, the only sex offenders excluded from an opportunity to be 
exempted from the requirement to register were violent sexual predators. However, 
subsequent to the Appellant's change of plea and sentencing, in fact approximately eleven 
(11) years later, Idaho Code Section IS-831 0 was amended to provide that any offender 
who has been convicted of an "aggravated offense" could not petition to be exempted 
from the duty to register. It defined an "aggravated offense" to include lewd conduct 
without the previously iterated exceptions for victims less than twelve (12) years of age. 
In 2011, as set forth above, the legislature amended the definition of "aggravated 
offense to include lewd conduct as an aggravated offense, regardless of the age of the 
victim. This is the law that was applied by the present Court in detennining to initially 
deny Appellant's Motion to be exempt from this statute. 
So, it is obvious that the Court has applied the latest amendment to Idaho Code 
Section IS-S31 0 retroactively to the Appellant which, at least initially, elicit ex post facto 
considerations. 
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According to the Court in State v. Forhes, 152 Idaho 849,275 P.3d 864 (2012), 
said Court has already addressed the issue of whether the amendment is retroactive, 
holding that the Legislature, by implication, intended the amendment to apply to 
offenders who have already been granted a withheld judgment. State v. Hanhvick, 150 
Idaho at 582-583, 249 P.3d at 381-82. 
However, the real question then becomes whether retroactive application of the 
amendment(s) violates the ex post facto clauses ofthe United States Constitution and the 
Idaho Constitution. 
Ex post facto laws are prohibited by article I, section 9, clause 3 of the 
United States Constitution and by article 1, section 6 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Hardwick, 150 Idaho at 581, 249 P .3d at 3 80 (quoting 
Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. O/Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 262, 207 
P.3d 988, 993 (2009)). The ex post facto clauses prevent the enactment of 
"any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which 
was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment 
for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with 
crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act 
was committed. '" Wheeler, 147 Idaho 257, 262, 207 P.3d 988,993 (2009) 
(quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70,46 S.Ct. 68, 69,70 L.Ed. 
216,217-18 (1925)). 
This Court has already addressed this issue in Hardwick 150 Idaho at 581-
83, 249 P.3d at 380-82, holding that retroactive application of the 
amendment was not punitive, and, therefore, not an ex post facto law 
because it effectuated the Legislature'S non-punitive purpose for enacting 
the Sex Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-to-
Know Act, which was "to protect communities by requiring sexual 
offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies, [regardless if 
they were previously subject to a \vithheldjudgment], and to make certain 
information about sexual offenders available to the public .... " Ch. 411, ~ 
2, 1998 Idaho Sess. La\vs 1275, 1276. Where this Court has previously 
interpreted a statute, the "rule of stare decisis dictates that [this Court] 
follow [controlling precedent] ... , unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it 
has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is 
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice." Houghland Farms. Illc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72. 
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77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990). Because Hardwick was decided after the 
district court rendered its decision in this case, the district court addressed 
this issue without the benefit of Hardwick. 
Furthennore, Appellant cannot obtain a final dismissal from the original charge 
under Idaho Code Section 19-2604( I), thereby restoring him to his civil rights. The real 
question here is do the amendments' alleged, non-punitive purpose trump any contention 
that the actual effect of Appellant having to continue to register as a sex offender is 
punitive? In other words, is the Legislature's classification of Appellant's offense as an 
aggravated offense subsequent to his guilty plea, an exception to the general 
understanding that the Sexual Offender Registration Act is non-punitive? 
According to the Statement of Purpose accompanying the 2009 SORA 
amendments, they were intended only as "teclmical amendments and 
updates." State of Purpose, H.R. 178, 60th Leg., 1 st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 
2009). Because SORA as a whole is regulatory in purpose there is no 
reason to infer that the Legislature intended these "technical amendments 
and updates" as anything other than civil and nonpunitive. In order for the 
2009 SORA amendments to violate the ex post facto clause, despite their 
civil denomination, we would have to detennine that they are nonetheless 
punitive. 
See State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41, 266 P.3d 1146 (2011). 
And further, in addition to the Constitutional ex post facto considerations set out 
above, there are also due process concerns which, if nothing else, would seem to suggest 
that Appellant is entitled to an opportunity to he heard relative to the punitive nature of 
the amendment in this particular case. When a person's good name, reputation, honor, or 
integrity is at stake because of what the Government is doing, notice and an opportunity 
to be heard (due process) are essential, certainly where the State attaches 'a badge of 
infamy' to the citizen. Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 827, 203 P.3d 1221, 1226 (2009). 
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How can any court determine the effect, or impact, of the legislative amendments without 
allowing the Appellant to present evidence and testimony as to impacts upon him? 
Appellant asserts that the legislative amendments are unconstitutional on their face, as 
well as in their application. 
It is difficult for Appellant to consider the amendments in question non-punitive 
in nature when, at the time of his sentencing, he understood that within ten (l0) years, he 
would be able to be exempted from the Sex Offender Registry. Instead, after serving a 
spotless probation, complying with all requirements of the Court and the Department of 
Corrections, he has nothing to look forward to but a lifetime of "not being able to be 
present on the premises of any school building where children under the age of eighteen 
(18) are present, forbidden to be present on a public road within 500 feet from the 
property line of school grounds of this state where children under the age of 18 are 
present, drive within 500 feet of the property in which a school is located, be excluded 
from any activities where children under the age of eighteen (18) are knowingly going to 
be present, and not be able to receive or give candy on Halloween, to expect to have his 
photograph broadcast on public television at least two times per year, and his name and 
photo printed in the newspaper, as well as not being able to obtain gainful employment as 
any citizen should be allowed to do. 
Appellant realizes that sexual offender registration statutes may not represent ex 
post facto laws such that they are unconstitutional in themselves. However, amendment 
of a sexual registration requirement from certain requirements at the time of guilty plea 
and sentencing, to more extensive deprivation of certain liberties because of Appellant's 
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required extended period ofregistration, i.e., the ten (10) year requirement to a life time 
requirement, does relegate said amendment to a level that amounts to an ex post facto la\v 
\"iolating Appellant's Constitutional Rights. 
This case is unique in that the Appellant's primary focus, and allegation of 
unconstitutionality, rely primarily upon the fact that the State of Idaho has taken alvaJ' 
rights from Appellant that he previously had the benefit of. In fact, Appellant had the 
right to petition for exemption from the registry for approximately eleven (11) years. 
While Appellant certainly objects to those changes in the law which have increased the 
registration burden upon him, his primary complaint for relief focuses upon the State of 
Idaho's actions in taking away rights that had been previously granted. 
CONCLUSION 
It is Appellant's position that the most recent case law and the "intent-effects" test 
weigh in favor of Appellant and in finding SORA unconstitutional, both on its face, and 
based upon its effect. Appellant further asserts that he should be free of ex post facto 
laws, but, at the very least, that the United States and Idaho Constitutions should operate 
to protect individual liberties from retroactive infringement. At a minimum, Appellant 
should have been granted an evidentiary hearing to preserve his due process rights. 
;~ 
DATED Thisb day of November, 2013. 
FULLER A W OFFICES 
J. FULLER 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILI~ 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on the £ day of November, 2013, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be mailed, United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Cheryl E. Meade 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, ID 83642 
- 24 -
